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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a new approach to estimating the existence and magnitude of tax-
motivated income shifting within multinational corporations. Existing studies of income 
shifting use changes in corporate tax rates as a source of identification. In contrast, this paper 
exploits exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm and investigates how these shocks 
propagate across low-tax and high-tax multinational subsidiaries. This approach is 
implemented using a large panel of European multinational affiliates over the period 1995-
2005. The central result is that parents’ positive earnings shocks are associated with a 
significantly positive increase in pretax profits at low-tax affiliates, relative to the effect on 
the pretax profits of high-tax affiliates. The result is robust to controlling for various other 
differences between low-tax and high-tax affiliates and for country-pair-year fixed effects. 
Additional tests suggest that the estimated effect is attributable primarily to the strategic use 
of debt across affiliates. The magnitude of income shifting estimated using this approach is 
substantial, but somewhat smaller than that found in the previous literature. 
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1) Introduction 
In recent years, global economic integration has been associated with increasing 
activity by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Over the period 1990-2006, for example, global 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNEs grew at an annual rate of 12.4%, much faster than 
the 5% annual rate of economic growth, and global FDI flows totalled $1.3 trillion in 2006 
(UNCTAD, 2007). Thus, the effects of tax systems on MNEs are of growing interest and 
importance to scholars and policymakers. Differences across countries in tax rates and 
systems create opportunities for tax arbitrage by MNEs, in particular through the strategic 
choice of transfer prices for goods and services traded among affiliates and through the 
strategic use of debt financing across affiliates.1
In response, policymakers in many countries have sought to limit profit shifting 
activities through the introduction of transfer pricing and thin-capitalization rules (e.g. 
Buettner et al., 2006). The perceived problem of cross-border income shifting has also given 
rise to proposals for more fundamental reforms of the current system of international 
corporate taxation. In 2001, the European Commission proposed the abolition of separate 
accounting rules for corporate taxation of MNEs within the borders of the European Union 
(EU) to be replaced by a system of profit consolidation and formula apportionment 
(European Commission, 2001). Avi Yonah and Clausing (2008) also propose a system of 
formula apportionment for Federal corporate taxation by the United States. Both these 
proposals are motivated by a desire to limit the opportunities for profit shifting that are 
believed to exist under current rules. 
 Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests 
that MNEs avail themselves of these opportunities to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax 
jurisdictions.  
The empirical identification of the existence and magnitude of tax-motivated profit 
shifting is inherently fraught with difficulty. Most existing studies thus pursue an indirect 
identification strategy that measures the impact of variations in corporate tax rates on the 
profitability of multinational subsidiaries (e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice, 
1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). A small number of papers pursue more direct approaches 
that examine the effect of corporate tax rate changes on specific profit shifting channels, in 
                                                          
1 In particular, MNEs have an incentive to charge relatively low prices for goods and services transferred from 
high-tax to low-tax affiliates, and to finance the activities of high-tax affiliates using debt issued by low-tax 
affiliates (a practice that is sometimes termed “earnings stripping”). See, for example, Dharmapala (2008) for a 
simple discussion of these strategies. 
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particular on distortions of transfer prices and the debt-equity structure.2
In the existing literature (e.g. Weichenrieder, 2009), such potential confounding 
effects have been addressed by focusing on the tax rate differential between the home country 
(the location of the parent firm) and the host country (the location of the affiliate). Because 
the tax differential can change due to statutory tax rate changes in either country, this 
approach can potentially control for country-year effects (e.g. unobserved effects common to 
all MNE affiliates in Slovakia in 1998). However, it has not been possible in previous studies 
to control for unobserved country-pair-year effects – e.g. unobserved effects common to all 
Slovak affiliates of German parents in 1998. Moreover, statutory tax rate changes tend to be 
relatively infrequent and episodic rather than continuous. Given the growing importance for 
policy of MNE profit-shifting, it would also be valuable to complement the existing studies, 
all of which use identification strategies based on tax rates, with an analysis using a 
fundamentally different approach. 
 All of these existing 
studies rely on identification through variation in corporate tax rates. While statutory 
corporate tax rate changes are likely to be exogenous with respect to firms’ behavior, 
interpreting the estimated impact of corporate tax rate changes may not be straightforward for 
a number of reasons. Corporate tax rate changes impose a common shock to all firms in a 
country, and so may potentially be correlated with unobserved variables that also determine 
the profitability, transfer prices, and financing choices of MNEs. In addition, changes in the 
corporate tax rate may not only affect the MNE’s incentive to engage in profit shifting, but 
may also impact other decision margins. A rise in the corporate tax rate may, for example, 
dampen incentives to exert effort and consequently lower corporate profitability.  
This paper develops an alternative approach to analyzing profit shifting behavior 
among MNEs. Our identification strategy exploits earnings shocks at the parent firm and 
analyzes how these shocks propagate across the affiliates of a multinational group. If MNEs 
engage in profit shifting behavior, an exogenous increase in the income of the parent firm 
should presumably be partially shifted towards affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions, assuming 
that the MNE has arranged its affairs so that some given fraction of the parent’s profits are 
shifted. A simple theoretical model developed below shows that, under a very general 
                                                          
2 Swenson (2001), Clausing (2003) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) investigate how corporate tax rates 
affect the choice of intra-firm transfer prices. While Swenson’s study finds only small effects, Clausing (2003) 
and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) report substantial responses of transfer prices to corporate taxes. Buettner 
and Wamser (2007) analyze how tax rate changes affect the corporate debt-equity structure and find significant 
although quantitatively small effects that are consistent with the profit shifting hypothesis. 
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formulation of the costs of profit shifting, the amount of profit shifted from the (high-tax) 
parent firm to low-tax affiliates is larger the higher are the parent’s profits, for a given 
difference in the tax rates faced by the parent and the low-tax affiliate. 
Of course, there are many reasons other than tax-motivated profit shifting – such as 
risk sharing within the MNE, or the operation of internal capital markets – for the 
propagation of earnings shocks through a multinational group. These alternative explanations, 
however, would (at least to a first approximation) apply to both high-tax and low-tax 
affiliates. This suggests an identification strategy that focuses on the shifting of exogenous 
earnings shocks at the parent firm to low-tax subsidiaries, relative to the corresponding 
shifting of exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm to high-tax subsidiaries. 
The challenge for this approach is of course to isolate a source of exogenous shocks to 
the income of the parent firm. We adapt for this purpose an approach developed in a different 
context by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and construct an expected earnings 
shock variable based on the earnings of firms that operate in the same industry and/or in the 
same country as the parent firm.3
Our results show strong support for the profit shifting hypothesis. While the effect of 
earnings shocks at the parent firm on the income of high-tax affiliates is indistinguishable 
from zero, we find a significantly positive impact of earnings shocks at the parent firm on the 
 This provides a measure of the parents’ exogenous income 
before taxes and before profit shifting activities. To construct these earnings shocks, we use a 
large European micro dataset (the AMADEUS data from the Bureau van Dijk) which 
provides detailed accounting and ownership information on 1.6 million firms within the 
countries of the EU. The data is provided in panel format and allows us to link information on 
parent firms and their subsidiaries. Importantly, the AMADEUS data is unconsolidated (i.e. 
data is reported separately for each affiliate, rather than being consolidated across the entire 
MNE). The analysis focuses on the impact on a multinational affiliate’s income of an 
exogenous shock to its parent’s income. The sample – which consists of over 21,000 
observations on approximately 5400 multinational affiliates over the period 1995-2005 - is 
restricted to affiliates that operate in a different industry and country from their parent firms, 
so that the earnings shocks experienced by the parents do not directly impact the affiliates. 
                                                          
3 Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) use their approach to analyze “tunnelling” – the phenomenon of 
individual or family shareholders who control a group of firms shifting income from those firms in which they 
own a relatively small stake to those firms in which they own a relatively large stake. This approach has not 
previously been used to analyze tax-motivated profit shifting. As discussed in Section 5 below, tunneling is 
unlikely to be of much relevance in our sample, which is restricted mostly to affiliates that are wholly-owned by 
their parents. 
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income of low-tax affiliates (relative to the effect on the income of high-tax affiliates). This 
basic result is robust to the use of affiliate, year, industry-year, country-year, and country-
pair-year fixed effects. The result also cannot be attributed to a number of potential 
alternative explanations relating to nontax differences between low-tax and high-tax affiliates 
(including differences in their industrial composition, differences in the degree of correlation 
between the economies of their host countries and those of their parents, and differences in 
the strength of the financial system in their host countries). Additional tests suggest that the 
estimated effect is attributable primarily to the strategic use of debt across affiliates. 
Quantitatively, the estimates suggest that at the margin around 2% of additional parent 
earnings are shifted to low-tax subsidiaries. While substantial, this magnitude is somewhat 
smaller than that found in the previous literature. 
The intuition underlying our approach extends beyond earnings shocks experienced 
by the parent firm – a positive earnings shock experienced by any high-tax affiliate should be 
associated with income shifting to low-tax affiliates. However, because AMADEUS data is 
restricted to European affiliates, it is not possible to construct worldwide earnings shocks to 
MNEs. Tests using the available (European) data yield results that are consistent with tax-
motivated income shifting, albeit somewhat weaker than those using only earnings shocks 
experienced by parent firms.  
Finally, several factors – including the inability to observe accounting data on tax 
haven affiliates outside Europe, the inability to observe the income reported to the tax 
authorities as distinct from accounting income on firms’ financial statements, and the use of 
worldwide tax systems by some countries – create a bias against the paper’s findings, and 
suggest that the magnitude of the profit shifting effect may be understated. Thus, our analysis 
uses a very different approach from that in the previous literature to find support for the profit 
shifting hypothesis, and in particular to find evidence of profit shifting effects that are 
substantial in magnitude. 
 The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present a simple theoretical model 
to motivate our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 describe the estimation methodology and the data. 
Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2) A Simple Theoretical Model 
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model to motivate our empirical 
analysis. Consider a representative MNE that consists of affiliates in countries a and b. These 
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affiliates earn (exogenous) pre-tax profits 𝜋𝑖 and face corporate tax rates 𝑡𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝑎, 𝑏}. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that country a is the high-tax country (i.e. 𝑡𝑎 > 𝑡𝑏). It 
is also assumed that the MNE’s home country has a territorial (or exemption) tax system that 
does not seek to tax the MNE’s profits earned abroad.4 The MNE can shift accounting profits 
between the two affiliates, for instance by charging a lower transfer price for goods and 
services bought by affiliate b from affiliate a, or by creating financial arrangements in which 
affiliate a borrows from affiliate b. It is assumed that each country defines taxable income as 
being identical to accounting income.5
The fraction of affiliate a’s pre-tax profit that is shifted to the low-tax affiliate b is 
denoted by x. As in the previous literature (e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000), we assume 
that profit shifting behavior imposes costs C on the MNE. These costs may be interpreted in a 
variety of ways, which are not mutually exclusive. For instance, they may be payments for 
accounting or legal services associated with profit shifting. Of course, it is not generally 
thought that MNEs engage in egregiously illegal tax evasion. However, they may adopt more 
or less aggressive tax positions, in relation for example to the arm’s–length standard used by 
many countries for transfer pricing, or to thin-capitalization rules for debt structure. More 
aggressive positions would, if challenged by the tax authorities, have a lower probability of 
being sustained by courts (or may require more resources to defend successfully). MNEs may 
also face negative publicity if their effective tax rates are disseminated by advocacy groups 
such as the Tax Justice Network. These considerations suggest that the costs of profit shifting 
are likely to depend on the fraction x of the high-tax affiliate’s profits shifted, as well as on 
the amount of income shifted (denoted here by 𝑦 = 𝑥𝜋𝑎).
 
6
                                                          
4 For instance, if a is the residence country of the parent firm, the assumption is that country a only taxes the 
domestic profits of affiliate a, and not the profits earned in country b by affiliate b. Some of the countries in the 
empirical analysis (such as the UK) used worldwide systems of taxation during the sample period. Under 
worldwide taxation, foreign profits are subject to taxation by the home country (in terms of our example, 
country a taxes profits earned in country b). A pure form of worldwide taxation would eliminate the incentive to 
shift profits. In reality, however, worldwide systems have features – such as the deferral of country a’s tax on 
income earned in b until affiliate b pays a dividend to the parent in country a – that result in the persistence of 
some incentives for profit shifting, albeit in somewhat attenuated form. Empirically, the inclusion of firms from 
worldwide countries in our analysis creates a bias against finding a profit shifting effect, as discussed in Section 
5. 
 In practice, some of the types of 
5 That is, both a and b are assumed to be “one-book” countries with systems of book-tax conformity. The 
possibility that the definitions of financial and taxable income may diverge, as occurs in “two-book” countries, 
creates a bias against the paper’s empirical findings, as discussed in Section 5. 
6 For example, thin capitalization rules may typically be formulated to require that interest payments are below 
some fraction of income, or to restrict deductibility of interest when debt exceeds some fraction of assets (e.g. 
Buettner et al., 2006) 
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costs noted above may be tax-deductible, while others are not. For simplicity, it is assumed 
here that C is non-deductible.7
In the light of the discussion above, we assume that the cost of profit shifting C = 
C (𝑥, 𝑦) = C(𝑥, 𝑥𝜋𝑎) is strictly positive, increasing in each argument, and convex in each 
argument: 
 
Assumption 1: 𝐶(. , . ) >  0,𝐶𝑥(. , . ) >  0,𝐶𝑦(. , . ) >  0,𝐶𝑥𝑥(. , . ) >  0,𝐶𝑦𝑦(. , . ) >  0 
The MNE’s worldwide after-tax profits (denoted by ) can be expressed as: 
Π = (1 − 𝑡𝑎)(1 − 𝑥)𝜋𝑎 + (1 − 𝑡𝑏)(𝜋𝑏 + 𝑥𝜋𝑎) − 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑥𝜋𝑎)        (1) 
or equivalently as: 
Π = (1 − 𝑡𝑎) �1 − 𝑦𝜋𝑎�𝜋𝑎 + (1 − 𝑡𝑏)(𝜋𝑏 + 𝑦) − 𝐶 � 𝑦𝜋𝑎 ,𝑦�                              (2) 
The MNE chooses x (or equivalently y) to maximize . Using Equation (1), the FOC with 
respect to x is: (𝑡𝑎 − 𝑡𝑏) 𝜋𝑎 − 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑥 − 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑦 𝜋𝑎 = 0                    (3) 
Equivalently, using Equation (2), the FOC with respect to y is: (𝑡𝑎 − 𝑡𝑏)  − 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑥 1𝜋𝑎 − 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑦 = 0                     (4) 
The comparative statics of this problem imply that the optimal fraction x and the amount of 
profit shifted (y) are both increasing in the tax differential between countries a and b: 
𝜕2Π
𝜕𝑥𝜕(𝑡𝑎−𝑡𝑏) = 𝜋𝑎 > 0 and 𝜕2Π𝜕𝑦𝜕(𝑡𝑎−𝑡𝑏) = 1 > 0                  (5) 
Intuitively, if the tax rate differential between countries a and b increases, the marginal gain 
from shifting one unit of profit between the affiliates rises and consequently it becomes more 
attractive to shift profit from the high-tax to the low-tax firm. This is the basic insight 
underlying the existing literature on income shifting (using tax rate differentials as the source 
of identification). 
 The result described above regarding tax rate differentials also holds in a simpler 
model in which the cost function depends only on the amount of income shifted (i.e. C = 
C (𝑦)). The more general formulation used here (where C = C (𝑥,𝑦)) also yields results on 
how income-shifting responds to changes in affiliate a’s pre-tax profit 𝜋𝑎. The optimal 
fraction x is increasing 𝜋𝑎 if the following expression: 
                                                          
7 The results are not fundamentally affected if the costs are deductible. However, deductibility adds considerable 
complexity, as it is not entirely obvious in which country the costs would be incurred, and there would be an 
incentive to shift these deductions from country b to country a. 
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𝜕2Π
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝜋𝑎
= (𝑡𝑎 − 𝑡𝑏) − 𝜕𝐶𝜕𝑦                      (6) 
is positive – i.e. if the derivative of the cost of profit shifting with respect to the amount of 
profit shifted (evaluated at the optimal choice) is sufficiently small in relation to the tax 
differential between the affiliates. When this condition is satisfied, it is optimal for the MNE 
to shift a larger fraction of affiliate a’s profit to the low-tax affiliate in b when 𝜋𝑎 increases. 
This condition, however, is not necessary to derive the result that the amount of profit shifted 
(𝑦 = 𝑥𝜋𝑎) is increasing in affiliate a’s pre-tax profit: 
𝜕2Π
𝜕𝑦𝜕𝜋𝑎
= 𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑥
1
𝜋𝑎2
> 0                       (7) 
As the optimal choice of 𝑦 = 𝑥𝜋𝑎 increases in 𝜋𝑎, even in circumstances in which x falls, it 
follows that affiliate b’s profit before taxes and after income shifting (i.e. 𝜋𝑏 + 𝑥𝜋𝑎) 
increases with exogenous increases in 𝜋𝑎.  
This last result suggests a new empirical test for income shifting. The results above on 
the effects of earnings shocks in country a on the pre-tax profit declared by the affiliate in 
country b are derived under the assumption that the tax rate in country b is lower than the tax 
rate in country a. On the other hand, if country b’s tax rate is higher, earnings shocks at the 
affiliate in country a should have no effect on the pre-tax profit reported in country b. This 
asymmetry implies an identification strategy for our empirical analysis. As profit shifting 
activities are predicted to show up through a positive effect of earnings shocks on the pre-tax 
profit level of foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries only, foreign subsidiaries in high-tax 
countries can be used as a control group that captures other potential linkages between the 
pre-tax profits of affiliates in the same multinational group. This approach is described in 
more detail in the following section. 
 
3) Empirical Strategy and Specification 
In the previous section, it was argued that the hypothesis of tax-motivated corporate 
profit shifting implies that parents’ earnings shocks exert a positive impact on profit shifting 
to subsidiaries with a lower corporate tax rate than the parent firm, relative to the impact on 
profit shifting to subsidiaries with a similar or higher corporate tax rate than the parent firm. 
Thus, identifying profit shifting activities involves computing earnings shocks to the 
multinational parent firm and tracking their propagation among foreign subsidiaries within 
the same multinational group. Specifically, we expect a positive effect of earnings shocks at 
the parent firm on the pre-tax profitability of the treatment group (subsidiaries in low-tax 
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countries) compared to the control group (subsidiaries in high-tax countries). Formally, this 
difference-in-difference approach is captured by the following regression model: 
ittiitititititit xda ερφαπαπαααπ ++++⋅+++= 43210 )~log(~logloglog         (8) 
where the dependent variable is the log of the balance sheet item “profit before taxation”. 
Following the previous literature, we use the log of profits, as the distribution of this variable 
is highly skewed.  
In the baseline analysis, we follow earlier research (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) 
and limit the sample to affiliates with positive pre-tax profits, for which profit-shifting 
incentives are most likely to be relevant. However, when tax systems allow loss 
carryforwards and carrybacks, incentives for profit shifting may persist even when the 
affiliate’s income is negative. For instance, suppose that every country’s tax system allows 
full loss offsets. Then, the MNE would find it advantageous to shift income to a loss-making 
low-tax affiliate (relative to a loss-making high-tax affiliate).8
 The explanatory variable of central interest 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 measures the parent firm’s profits 
before taxes and before shifting activities. The parent’s observed pre-tax profit is potentially 
affected by profit shifting activity, so it is necessary to construct a proxy for “pre-shifting” 
profits. To do this, we follow the approach developed in a different context by Bertrand, 
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002). They construct a measure of firms’ expected profits before 
“tunnelling” activity (the practice of individual or family shareholders who control a group of 
 On the other hand, if tax 
systems allow no loss offsets, then there will be no differential incentive to shift income to a 
loss-making low-tax affiliate, relative to a loss-making high-tax affiliate – both affiliates will 
in effect face a zero tax rate. In reality, tax systems fall somewhere between these extremes: 
some incentive to shift income to low-tax affiliates may persist, but is likely to be attenuated 
because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. Nonetheless, to address the 
concern that information may be lost by excluding loss-making observations, a robustness 
check adds these observations to the sample. This uses a simple modification of Equation (8) 
in which the dependent variable is log(𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾), where K is a constant chosen such that 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾 > 0 for 99% of observations (including those with negative 𝜋𝑖𝑡). As described in 
Section 5, the results are similar to the baseline results, but somewhat weaker. 
                                                          
8 For example, imagine a MNE consisting of a parent facing a 35% tax rate, a high-tax affiliate facing a 45% tax 
rate, and a low-tax affiliate facing a 10% tax rate. If both affiliates have negative income, shifting $1 from the 
parent to the low-tax affiliate will result in a reduction of $0.10 in the loss offset paid by the low-tax 
government, whereas shifting $1 from the parent to the high-tax affiliate will result in a reduction of $0.45 in the 
loss offset paid by the high-tax government. Thus, with full loss offsets, the incentive to shift income 
differentially to the low-tax affiliate will exist even when affiliates have negative income. 
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firms and shift income from those firms in which they own a relatively small stake to those 
firms in which they own a relatively large stake). Although tunnelling within business groups 
and tax-motivated profit shifting among MNEs are very different phenomena, it is possible to 
adapt their approach to construct a measure of expected earnings (prior to any shifting 
activity) for the parent firm. Specifically, this involves determining the pre-tax profitability of 
comparable firms which operate in the same 4-digit industry and/or in the same country. The 
construction of this variable is described in more detail in the next section. 
In the presence of multinational profit shifting activities, this earnings shock at the 
parent level is expected to exert an asymmetric effect on subsidiaries with a lower and higher 
corporate tax rate than the parent firm. We thus define a dummy variable 𝑑𝑖𝑡 which takes on 
the value 1 if the subsidiary faces a lower corporate tax rate than the parent firm, and the 
value 0 otherwise. The results in the previous section imply that we expect a positive 
coefficient estimate 𝛼3 for the interaction of this dummy variable with the parent’s expected 
profit. The sign of the coefficient estimate of the parent’s expected profit 𝛼2 is a priori 
undetermined and depends on other potential (e.g. technological and financial) linkages 
between parent and subsidiary profitability. If, for example, technological advances at the 
parent firm enhance the profitability of the parent’s capital and also positively affect 
subsidiary productivity, we expect this coefficient to be positive. However, the sign of 𝛼2 
does not affect the main results. 
The constructed shock 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 may be either positive or negative. A negative shock 
implies that the parent is predicted to make a loss in pretax and pre-shifting terms. If tax 
systems allow full loss offsets, then the incentive to shift income from the parent to a low-tax 
affiliate will persist even for a loss-making parent. On the other hand, if tax systems allow no 
loss offsets, then a loss-making parent in effect faces a zero tax rate, and so will typically 
have no incentive to shift income out. As noted above, tax systems fall somewhere between 
these extremes, and the incentive to shift income to low-tax affiliates is likely to be attenuated 
for loss-making parents because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. Thus, 
the baseline analysis excludes observations for which the parent’s constructed shock 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 is 
negative. However, a robustness check adds these observations to the sample, modifying 
Equation (8) so that the shock variable is log(𝜋�𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾�), where 𝐾� is a constant chosen such 
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that 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾� > 0 for 99% of observations (including those with negative 𝜋�𝑖𝑡). As described in 
Section 5, the results are similar to the baseline results, but somewhat weaker.9
The specification in Equation (8) also controls for variations in firm size and country 
characteristics over time and include total assets 𝑎𝑖𝑡 and several host country characteristics 
captured by the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (GDP per capita, population and the host country's corporate tax 
rate) in the set of regressors.
 
10
 Our estimation approach has two main advantages compared to previous papers that 
identify profit shifting through changes in the corporate tax rate. First, we identify profit 
shifting behavior by exploiting the rich and continuous variation in the parent's earnings 
measure rather than relying on infrequent and episodic changes in corporate tax rates. 
Additionally, the approach allows us to control for unobserved country-year and country-
pair-year fixed effects, which was not possible in the previous literature due to the perfect 
collinearity of these effects with changes in the host country corporate tax rate or the 
corporate tax rate differential between home and host countries. 
 In addition, affiliate fixed effects are included to control for 
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. A full set of year fixed effects are used to 
control for unobserved shocks over time that are common to all firms in our sample. In some 
specifications, we augment the model with a full set of industry-year dummies at the two-
digit level using the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
Européenne (NACE) classification, to account for shocks specific to certain industries. We 
also run specifications which add a full-set of country-year effects to the model and thus 
control for country-specific shocks over time (and hence for any country-specific trends). 
Finally, we also run specifications with a full set of country-pair-year effects, where a 
country-pair consists of the affiliate’s country and the parent’s country. 
 
4) Data 
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed 
information on firms’ ownership structure and financial statement data for 1.6 million 
                                                          
9 The basic empirical specification (Equation (8)) uses the constructed shock 𝜋�𝑖𝑡  directly as an explanatory 
variable in the regression. This follows the approach developed by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), 
described in more detail in Section 4. An alternative possibility is to use the constructed shock 𝜋�𝑖𝑡  as an 
instrument for the observed (post-shifting) profit of the parent. This alternative approach yields results that are 
very similar to the baseline findings described in Section 5. 
10 Using other size controls such as sales or the number of employees yields similar results to those reported 
below.   
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national and multinational corporations in 38 European countries from 1995 to 2005, but is 
unbalanced in structure. We restrict our sample to countries within the EU-25 (the 25 states 
that were members of the EU at the end of our sample period), as these countries are the most 
extensively represented in the database. The observational units in our empirical analysis are 
subsidiaries of multinational groups that are located within the EU-25. Our criterion for 
defining a multinational subsidiary is the existence of a foreign corporate immediate 
shareholder (parent) that owns at least a 90% stake in the subsidiary.11 Since our aim is to 
investigate the propagation of earnings shocks at the parent firm to (foreign) subsidiaries in 
the multinational group, it is necessary to restrict our sample to subsidiaries with a parent that 
is also located in an EU-25 country.12
In line with previous studies on multinational profit shifting (e.g. Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008), we restrict our analysis to firms with positive pre-tax profits and with more 
than five employees. Our basic sample consists of 21,298 observations on 5,398 
multinational subsidiaries over the years 1995 to 2005. Hence, we observe each affiliate for 
3.9 years on average. Given all these restrictions, our sample contains firms from all EU-25 
countries except Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. The country statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
Although our estimation sample consists only of multinational subsidiaries, we use 
data on all national and multinational firms contained in AMADEUS to construct the 
earnings shock variable for the parent companies in our sample. In total, we employ data on 
1.3 million firms for which information on profits and total assets is available. Following 
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we calculate the earnings level before taxation and 
shifting at the parent firm by constructing a proxy based on the profitability of comparable 
firms in the same time period. We follow three alternative assumptions to construct sets of 
comparable firms: first, we include all firms which belong to the same 4-digit NACE industry 
and which are located within the same country; second, we include all firms within the same 
4-digit NACE industry located within the EU-25; third, we account for all firms located in the 
same country. In all cases, the parent firm for which the expected profit is being calculated is 
itself excluded from the set of comparable firms.   
                                                          
11 Note that the results are robust to including only wholly-owned subsidiaries in the sample. 
12 Note in this context that the AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure is 
available for the last reported date only which is the year 2005 for most observations in our sample. Thus, in the 
context of our panel study, there is some scope for misclassifications of parent-subsidiary connections since the 
ownership structure may have changed over the sample period. However, in line with previous studies, this is 
not a serious concern since these misclassifications introduce noise to our estimations that will bias our results 
towards zero (see e.g. Budd, Konings and Slaughter, 2005). 
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Following Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we determine the total asset 
weighted average profitability of all firms in these groups (apart from the parent firm under 
consideration) where the profitability of firm j  at time t  is represented by 𝑝𝑗𝑡 and is defined 
as pre-tax profits over total assets, i.e. 𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝜋𝑗𝑡/𝑎𝑗𝑡. For each year t , subsidiary i ’s parent 
firm is assumed to experience a pre-tax and pre-shifting profitability 𝑝�𝑖 as measured by the 
total-asset-weighted average pre-tax profitability of comparable firms j , given by: 
∑∑
⋅=
j
j
j j
j
i pa
a
p~ ,    ji ≠ .          (9) 
In line with the analysis of Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we only include 
subsidiary-year combinations in our sample if we observe at least 10 comparable firms for the 
calculation of the parent earning level 𝑝�𝑖𝑡 in Equation (9).
13 Moreover, with respect to the 
second definition of comparable firms (i.e. firms within the same 4-digit industry in the EU-
25), only subsidiaries are included in the sample which operate in a different 4-digit NACE 
industry than their parent company to avoid obvious endogeneity problems.14
Table 2 reports the sample statistics for the parent firms’ predicted profitability 
measures. As discussed above, the sample is restricted to subsidiaries with parent firms that 
earn a positive predicted pre-tax and pre-shifting profit. To address outliers, we drop 
profitability rates in the upper 1% of the distribution. As presented in Table 2, the ratio of the 
parent firms’ average constructed pre-tax and pre-shifting profit to total assets is in the range 
of 4% to 5% (depending on the set of comparable firms used) but exhibits strong variation 
across observations.
 To determine a 
predicted value for the pre-tax profit at the parent firm level, we again follow Bertrand, 
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and calculate the parent's pre-tax and pre-shifting profit 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 
as the product of its predicted profitability 𝑝�𝑖𝑡 and its total asset stock 𝑎�𝑖𝑡, i.e. 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝�𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑎�𝑖𝑡.  
15
                                                          
13 The restriction is binding in a number of cases for the first definition of comparable firms which comprises 
firms in the same 4-digit industry and in the same country. 
 Multiplying by the parent’s total assets stock gives the parents’ 
14 To keep the information set as large as possible, we include multinational affiliates in the calculation of 𝑝�𝑖. 
This may raise concerns since multinational affiliates’ pre-tax profitability might itself be distorted by profit 
shifting behaviour. As a robustness check, we thus re-estimate the regressions calculating parent profitability 
shocks on the basis of national firms only (see Section 5).       
15 Note that the sample size differs across the three scenarios as firms are only included in the regression sample 
if firstly, the average profitability of comparable firms is positive (which may differ across scenarios) and 
secondly, the constructed profitability measure does not belong to the scenario specific group of outliers in the 
upper percentile of the distribution which are dropped from the analysis. Moreover, as the industry classification 
is missing for some firms in the data, the sample size is smaller in the scenarios which construct the profitability 
shocks based on firms in the same industry and/or country. In robustness checks, we ran the regressions on the 
sub-sample of firms which are included in the analysis of all three scenarios and find comparable results to the 
ones reported in the following section.     
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predicted pre-shifting profits, with sample averages varying from $150 to $220 million 
(depending on the construction of the set of comparable firms).  
 The subsidiaries in our sample are considerably smaller than their parent firms. This 
partly reflects the fact that AMADEUS does not consolidate the multinational subsidiary 
information at the country level. Hence, the parent firms in our sample tend to have a large 
number of wholly owned subsidiaries, on average 23.11 in our European sample countries 
and 31.26 subsidiaries worldwide.16 The subsidiaries have, on average, total assets of $115.1 
million and earn a pre-tax profit of $7.6 million. Additionally, the data includes information 
on the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate, GDP per capita and population size.17 The 
average statutory tax rate for the subsidiaries in our sample is 33.2%, varying between 10% 
and 57%. In general, parent firms tend to face higher corporate tax rates than do their 
subsidiaries (as headquarters tend to be disproportionately located in higher-tax countries). 
Consequently, for 60% of the subsidiaries in our sample, the local corporate tax is higher than 
that faced by its parent firm.18
 
   
5) Results 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 3 to 6. These tables use identical sets of 
specifications, based on Equation (8) and augmented in various ways as described below. 
They differ, however, in the set of comparable firms used to construct parents’ earnings 
shocks. All regressions include a full set of subsidiary fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level are shown in brackets below the coefficient 
estimates. 
 Table 3 presents model specifications that use the parent profit measure calculated 
based on firms in the same industry and country. Following our argument in Section 3, 
Specification (1) regresses the subsidiary’s pre-tax profit on the parent’s pre-tax and pre-
shifting earnings (𝜋�𝑖𝑡) and its interaction term with a dummy variable indicating low-tax 
subsidiaries (𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝜋�𝑖𝑡). We thus use a difference-in-difference approach. Common 
correlations between parent and subsidiary earnings are accounted for through the parent 
                                                          
16 Note though that not all the European subsidiaries of our sample parents are included in the data since not all 
of them report the necessary separate unconsolidated accounting information.   
17 The statutory tax rate data for the EU-25 is taken from the European Commission (2006), while the rates for 
affiliates outside the EU are based on data of the tax consultancy firm KPMG (2006). Country data for GDP per 
capita and population are obtained from EUROSTAT. The host countries’ average GDP per capita and 
population size are $21,599 and 35 million inhabitants, respectively. 
18 Note that this ignores any taxes on dividend repatriations imposed by parents’ home countries, in cases where 
the home country uses worldwide taxation. 
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profit variable 𝜋�𝑖𝑡 and the profit shifting (i.e. the treatment) effect is identified by allowing 
for a differential impact on the group of subsidiaries with lower local corporate tax rates than 
their parents. Specification (1) also controls for a full set of subsidiary fixed effects and the 
subsidiary’s total assets.  
The coefficient estimate for the parent’s pre-shifting profit (𝜋�𝑖𝑡) is positive, 
suggesting that parent earnings tend to exert a positive impact on subsidiaries’ profits (which 
may reflect, for example, technological spillover effects within multinational entities). 
However, the variable of interest is the interaction term 𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝜋�𝑖𝑡. Its coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant, suggesting that increases in parent earnings have a systematically 
stronger impact on the pre-tax profit reported by subsidiaries with a lower tax rate than the 
parent firm, relative to subsidiaries with a higher tax rate than the parent firm. Put differently, 
low-tax subsidiaries receive extra profits in the wake of positive earnings shocks at the parent 
level, consistent with the income shifting hypothesis. This result is robust to the inclusion of a 
full set of year dummies to absorb common shocks to all sample subsidiaries over time 
(Specification (2)). While this renders the coefficient estimate for the parent's pre-tax and 
pre-shifting profit insignificant, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term remains 
positive and statistically significant. In the following discussion, we assess the robustness of 
this finding to controlling for additional sources of heterogeneity between high-tax and low-
tax affiliates. 
  As discussed earlier, the sample is restricted to affiliates that operate in industries that 
are different from those of their parent firms. However, it is possible that low-tax affiliates 
may happen to be concentrated in industries with earnings shocks that are more strongly 
correlated with those of their parents than are high-tax affiliates. To address this possibility, 
Specification (3) adds a full set of two-digit industry-year effects to absorb industry-specific 
shocks over time. The basic result is essentially unchanged. 
 Affiliates are classified as low-tax or high-tax based on the relationship between their 
local corporate tax rate and that faced by their parent firm. Thus, it is possible that, for 
example, one affiliate in Slovakia is low-tax in relation to its German parent, while another 
affiliate in Slovakia is high-tax in relation to its Irish parent. Nonetheless, it remains true that 
low-tax affiliates are disproportionately located in countries with low statutory corporate tax 
rates. Time-invariant country characteristics are already controlled for through affiliate fixed 
effects (which subsume country fixed effects, given that affiliates do not change their 
location). However, lower-tax countries may experience country-specific shocks that differ 
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from those of the higher-tax countries in which high-tax affiliates tend to be located. One 
approach to controlling for these effects is to add a set of time-varying country controls. 
Specification (4) adds GDP per capita and population to the model, while Specification (5) 
also adds the corporate tax rate. This leaves the qualitative results essentially unchanged.   
 Nonetheless, finding appropriate control variables for the universe of potential 
country-specific shocks in the economic, social and political dimensions is infeasible. Thus, 
we add a full set of country-year fixed effects which control for unobserved country-specific 
shocks to corporate profitability over time. The results are presented in Specification (6) and 
confirm our previous findings: the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between 
parent earnings and the low-tax subsidiary dummy remains statistically significant with a 
positive sign.  
 There may, however, still be a concern that the low-tax subsidiaries in our sample 
tend to be located in countries whose economies are systematically more strongly correlated 
with the host economy of the parent firm than are the host economies of the group’s high-tax 
subsidiaries.19 To allow for this possibility, Specification (7) includes a full set of country-
pair-year effects. These country-pair-year effects, which were not feasible in the 
specifications used in the prior literature, absorb shocks to the parent country over time and 
allow for a heterogeneous transmission of these shocks to the subsidiary economies.20
Quantitatively, Specification (7) suggests that an increase in the pre-tax and pre-
shifting profits at the parent level by 10% enhances the profit earned at the affiliate by 0.4%.  
 Again, 
the findings are qualitatively unchanged.  
Evaluated at the sample mean, this implies that an increase in the parent firm’s pre-shifting 
profits by $22 million enhances the pre-tax profit reported at the subsidiary level (conditional 
on the subsidiary’s assets) by around $30,000. This effect may seem small, but it represents 
only the amount of income-shifting to one specific low-tax affiliate. In part because our 
analysis does not consolidate the subsidiaries of a given multinational group located within 
the same host country, the parent firms in our sample own a considerable number of foreign 
                                                          
19 A variant of this possibility is that the effect may differ across affiliates in Western and Eastern Europe, with 
the latter generally facing lower tax rates. However, the results are very similar and remain highly significant 
when observations for which either the affiliate or the parent is located in Eastern Europe (specifically, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) are omitted. 
20 The country-pair-year effects represent, in essence, a dummy variable for each combination of subsidiary 
location and parent home country in a given year – e.g. all affiliates located in Estonia with German parents in 
1998 would have a common country-pair-year effect. Of course, country-pair-year effects subsume the country-
year effects used in Specification (6). Note also that the time-varying country-level controls (such as GDP per 
capita) are no longer included in Specifications (6) and (7), as they are subsumed by country-year effects and a 
fortiori by country-pair-year effects. 
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subsidiaries. On average, a parent firm owns 23.11 subsidiaries in our European sample 
countries and 31.26 subsidiaries worldwide. As indicated in Table 2, 60% of the subsidiaries 
within Europe face a lower corporate tax rate than their parent firm, implying that a parent on 
average shifts profits to 13.9 subsidiaries.21
This estimate is quantitatively somewhat smaller than those found in the previous 
literature, using corporate tax rate changes as a source of identification. Existing studies 
typically estimate the semi-elasticity of affiliate pre-tax profits to changes in the tax rate 
difference between the affiliate and other firms in the multinational group. The estimates 
range from semi-elasticities of around -0.5 to -1.7 (see e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). 
Estimates for profit shifting activities between headquarters and (low-tax) subsidiaries are 
around -0.5, i.e. at the lower end of this range (see Dischinger and Riedel, 2010). Replicating 
the approach of the previous literature using this sample also results in a semi-elasticity of 
around -0.5, which implies that on average around 3.3% of the parents’ pre-shifting profits 
are transferred to low-tax subsidiaries.
 Evaluated at the sample mean, this implies that 
around $420,000 is shifted out of the parent country, representing 2% of the pre-shifting 
profit shock of $22 million. Assuming that this behaviour can be extrapolated to subsidiaries 
outside Europe (for which no financial data is available in AMADEUS), 2.6% of the 
additional profits would be shifted towards low-tax affiliates.  
22
As described in Section 4, the set of comparable firms used for the calculation of the 
parents’ pre-tax and pre-shifting profit comprises both national and multinational 
corporations. Including multinationals in the calculation keeps the information set as large as 
possible. On the other hand, multinational corporations’ pre-tax profitability might itself be 
distorted by profit shifting behavior.
 This exceeds our estimates of 2% of income being 
shifted within Europe and 2.6% worldwide. 
23
                                                          
21 The fraction of low-tax subsidiaries remains close to 60% if we account for all our parent firms’ subsidiaries 
in the EU-25 and worldwide.  
 As a sensitivity check, we thus construct the pre-tax 
22 Replicating the approach of the previous literature involves adding the tax rate differential between the 
subsidiary and its parent firm to our regression model (which results in a semi-elasticity of around -0.5), 
consistent with the previous literature. Using this identification approach, the fraction of profit shifted from our 
sample parents to their low-tax subsidiaries can be approximated by multiplying the semi-elasticity estimate by 
the average tax rate differential (7.7% in our sample) between parents and low-tax affiliates (see Huizinga and 
Laeven (2008) for an analogous approach). Consequently, the estimate suggests that around 3.3% (= -0.5*7.7%) 
of the parents’ pre-shifting profits are transferred to low-tax subsidiaries. 
23 Including multinational firms in the calculation of the shock variables may on the one hand lead to an 
overestimation of our effect, as e.g. positive profitability shocks in high-tax countries may be underestimated if 
multinational firms that are included in the calculation of 𝑝�𝑖  shift a fraction of the enhanced profits out of the country. On the other hand, the effect may be underestimated if the profitability of multinationals included in the 
calculation of 𝑝�𝑖  is affected by changes in profit shifting incentives (e.g. changes in anti-avoidance rules, such as transfer price documentation requirements). If incentives to shift profits from a high-tax parent country to a low-
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and pre-shifting profit at the parent level using only the profitability of the subgroup of 
national firms in the same industry and country. Specification (8) re-estimates Specification 
(7) using the parent earnings measure calculated based on national firms only. This exercise 
results in coefficient estimates that are very similar to those in Specification (7).24
The baseline specifications employ the affiliate’s pre-tax profit as the dependent 
variable. Pretax profit includes both the operating and financial profit of the firm. 
Consequently, the estimated effect can be interpreted as capturing potential profit shifting 
activities through both transfer price distortions (which affect the affiliate’s operating 
income) and through distortions to intra-firm debt (which affect the affiliate’s financial 
income). To disentangle the transfer pricing and debt shifting channels, we run specifications 
in which we employ the affiliate’s earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT), i.e. its 
operating profit, as the dependent variable. The strategic use of debt (in particular, the 
payment of interest by high-tax affiliates to low-tax affiliates) would be captured by pretax 
profit, but not by EBIT. On the other hand, EBIT would capture transfer pricing 
manipulation.  
    
The results of the EBIT regression are presented in Column (9). The coefficient 
estimate for the interaction between the parent’s pre-shifting profit and the low-tax subsidiary 
dummy is considerably smaller than in Column (8) and is statistically insignificant. This 
result is consistent with the profit shifting activity inferred from the baseline estimates 
occurring primarily through the use of inter-affiliate debt, rather than through transfer pricing. 
This pattern is likely driven by the design of our empirical approach as parents and subsidiary 
firms in our data belong to different industries and intra-firm trade across industries and thus 
transfer pricing opportunities are likely to be limited. Thus, the finding in Column (9) tends 
to reinforce the baseline results, in that the strategic use of debt is a more credible channel for 
profit shifting across industries and in response to relatively short-term earnings shocks 
experienced by the parent.25
                                                                                                                                                                                    
tax subsidiary are reduced, this for example enhances the estimated parent profitability 𝑝�𝑖 but simultaneously reduces the subsidiary’s profitability and thus biases the effect downwards. 
                    
24 Note that the sample size is smaller than in Specification (6). This is due to the fact that several country-
industry groups have fewer than 10 comparable firms if we account for national corporations only and are hence 
dropped from the analysis. Moreover, national firms in our data have a higher probability of making losses. 
Consequently, the constructed parent firms’ pre-shifting profit estimates are more likely to be negative, causing 
them to be excluded from the estimation (see Section 4). 
25 This inference is reinforced by examining differences in income shifting for firms with relatively high and 
relatively low degrees of R&D intensity. If transfer pricing were an important channel for the baseline income 
shifting result, then given the important role of intangible assets in transfer pricing, we would expect that 
income shifting would be concentrated among R&D-intensive firms. However, dividing the sample in this way 
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The results in Table 3 are based on parent earnings shocks calculated using data on 
firms in the same industry and country. To assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
definitions of the group of comparable firms, Tables 4 and 5 report the same set of 
specifications as in Table 3, using alternative measures of parent earnings shocks. Table 4 
reports results using parent earnings shocks calculated using data on all firms within the EU-
25 that operate in the same 4-digit industry as the parent under consideration. Table 5 reports 
results using parent earnings shocks calculated using data on all firms located within the same 
country as the parent under consideration. In both tables, Specifications (1) to (7) and 
specification (9) include the parent’s pre-shifting profit constructed based on national and 
multinational firms while Specification (8) uses the parent’s pre-shifting profit measure 
constructed based on the subsample of national firms only. Moreover, Specifications (1) to 
(8) employ the affiliate’s profit before taxation as dependent variable whereas the dependent 
variable in Specification (9) is the affiliate’s EBIT. All coefficient estimates for the parent’s 
earnings measures and its interaction term turn out to be qualitatively and quantitatively 
comparable to our previous results in Table 3, and thus support the hypothesis that 
multinational firms engage in quantitatively relevant profit shifting activities to low-tax 
subsidiaries.26
 As noted earlier, a potential alternative explanation for the propagation of parents’ 
shocks to their affiliates is the operation of internal capital markets within multinational 
entities.
 
27
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(using average R&D expenditures relative to sales at the industry level) does not yield significant differences in 
income shifting between R&D-intensive firms and other firms. 
 In particular, it might be the case that low-tax affiliates happen to be located in 
countries where it is more difficult or costly to obtain financing locally. Any time-invariant 
financing constraints are already captured by affiliate fixed effects, and any changes in 
countries’ financial markets over time by the country-year or country-pair-year fixed effects. 
The concern, however, is that the low-tax affiliate indicator is capturing the effect of 
weakness in the host country’s financial system, rather than tax status. To address this 
possibility, we use a measure of the strength of the financial system in the affiliate’s host 
country. Following previous papers, we use the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP 
(often referred to as “financial depth”) as a proxy for financial development which is obtained 
26 More precisely, the estimates suggest slightly larger effects than our baseline specifications, with 2.1% (2.9%) 
of additional parent earnings being shifted to low-tax subsidiaries within the EU-25 (worldwide). 
27 Dropping financial sector firms, which might be thought to play a greater role in internal capital markets, 
leads to results similar to the baseline findings. 
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from an updated version of the dataset described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) 
(see also Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009)).  
Specification (1) in Table 6 reestimates our baseline regression in Column (7) of 
Table 3 including the interaction between financial system deposits over GDP and the parent 
firm’s pre-shifting profit as an additional control variable (note that financial depth per se is 
subsumed by the country-pair-year effects). The coefficient estimates for the financial depth 
interaction are statistically insignificant. Most importantly, however, the estimation results 
confirm our previous findings - earnings shocks at the parent firm exert a significantly larger 
positive effect on the pre-tax profits of affiliates in low-tax countries relative to high-tax 
locations, even when controlling for the possibility of a differential effect with respect to 
financial depth. The basic result in Column (7) of Table (3) is also robust to excluding 
affiliates in countries with weakly developed financial markets from the sample (see 
Specifications (2) and (3)).28
Our baseline specification relies only on profit shocks to the parent firm. However, 
the intuition underlying our empirical strategy extends beyond this, and potentially applies to 
profit shocks at any other group affiliate. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compute group-
wide profit shocks, as the AMADEUS database only reports accounting information for 
European affiliates, even though many of the multinational entities in the sample own 
affiliates outside Europe (AMADEUS records the existence of non-European affiliates, but 
not any detailed information about them). Exploiting the available information, we construct 
two pre-shifting profit variables pertaining to affiliate i: first, the sum of the pre-shifting pre-
tax profits at all group affiliates within the EU-25 that face a higher corporate tax rate than 
affiliate i (including the parent if it satisfies this criterion) and second, the sum of the pre-
shifting pre-tax profits at all group affiliates within the EU-25 that face a lower corporate tax 
rate than affiliate i (including the parent if it satisfies this criterion).
 
29
                                                          
28 Specification (2) excludes affiliates in host countries with a ratio of financial system deposits to GDP smaller 
than 0.5 (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden). Specification (3) also excludes 
affiliates in host countries with a ratio of financial system deposits to GDP smaller than 0.65 (which corresponds 
to the mean of our sample countries). The additional excluded countries are the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Italy, and the Slovak Republic. Note also that the sample size for the regressions including the 
financial depth variable is slightly smaller than in the baseline regression as the information on financial system 
deposits over GDP is missing for some sample years. 
 In Specification (4) 
(Specification (5)) of Table 6, we regress the subsidiary’s pre-tax profit on the former (latter) 
variable.  
29 To ensure that our results are not driven by changes in the composition of firms that are used for the 
calculation of the shock variables, the construction uses only those firms for which we observe information on 
the pre-shifting profits for the whole sample period. 
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We find that profit shocks to affiliates with a higher corporate tax rate than affiliate i 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on subsidiary i’s profits, while profit 
shocks to affiliates with a lower corporate tax rate have an effect that is smaller and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with the baseline results, although 
the statistical significance is somewhat weaker. These findings should be interpreted with 
some caution. The lack of data for non-European affiliates introduces measurement error in 
the shock variables, biasing our coefficient estimates towards zero under the assumption that 
this error is random. It may also cause other systematic biases if non-European affiliates have 
systematically different characteristics than European subsidiaries. However, the fact that 
these results are in the expected direction is at least somewhat reassuring. 
 As AMADEUS does not report accounting information for non-European affiliates, 
our analysis does not account for profit shifting to zero-tax non-European havens.30 Applying 
the tax haven definition in Dharmapala and Hines (2009)31 and using the information in 
AMADEUS on the location of non-European affiliates, 58% of the affiliates in our sample 
belong to multinational entities that include at least one affiliate in a non-European tax haven. 
For these affiliates’ multinational groups, income shifting to non-European havens may serve 
as a substitute for income shifting to low-tax European countries. This would imply that low-
tax European affiliates in this subsample might be expected to experience a smaller effect of 
parent earnings shocks. On the other hand, it is possible that multinational entities with more 
profit-shifting opportunities are more likely to establish affiliates in non-European havens.32
 The available evidence suggests the latter interpretation – i.e. that multinational 
entities with more profit-shifting opportunities are more likely to establish affiliates in non-
European havens. The effect of parent earnings shocks on the income of low-tax affiliates 
 
Then, it is possible that low-tax European affiliates in this subsample may experience a larger 
effect of parent earnings shocks. In either case, however, the measured effect in our analysis 
would seem to be understated relative to the effect that would be obtained with accounting 
data on non-European haven affiliates. 
                                                          
30 On the other hand, as there is no accounting data for high-tax non-European affiliates, it is theoretically 
possible that there is a very large positive impact of shocks to parent earnings on the income of high-tax non-
European affiliates that would potentially weaken our result. Unfortunately, there is no way to completely rule 
out this possibility using this dataset. However, there is no reason to believe that the impact of parents’ earnings 
shocks on high-tax non-European affiliates would be so dramatically different from the essentially zero effect on 
high-tax European affiliates. 
31 This is based on the list of tax havens in Hines and Rice (1994). Results are similar using an alternative list of 
tax havens constructed by the OECD (and also reported in Dharmapala and Hines (2009)). 
32 Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) find that U.S. multinationals that are larger in size, have more opportunities for 
trade within the MNE, and higher R&D intensity are more likely to have tax haven affiliates. 
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(relative to the effect on high-tax affiliates) is larger and statistically significant in the 
subsample of affiliates belonging to multinational entities that include at least one affiliate in 
a non-European tax haven. This effect is smaller and not statistically significant in the 
subsample of affiliates belonging to multinational entities that include no affiliates in non-
European tax havens. This suggests that the effect we find in the full sample is concentrated 
among the former subsample. However, this does not undermine the basic result, as there 
would presumably be even more income-shifting that would be observed among this 
subsample if data on non-European haven affiliates were observed.33
There are a number of other considerations that also tend to create a bias against our 
findings. Our analysis relies on financial profit information (i.e. book income), which may 
deviate from the corporate profits reported for tax purposes (although financial and tax 
accounts are in general more closely linked in Europe than in other countries like the U.S., 
see e.g. Freedman, 2008). Book-tax differences may be caused by differences in the 
accounting rules governing the reporting of income for book and tax purposes, as well as by 
tax planning activities (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). To the extent that book and tax 
income diverge, the main implication for our analysis is that the parent may shift tax income 
(but not book income) to low-tax affiliates. This would tend to bias the profit shifting 
estimate downwards. To confound our results, the parent would have to be assumed to shift 
book income (but not tax income) to low-tax affiliates. It is unlikely that the parent would 
have any incentive to do this. Moreover, any changes in the accounting rules or practices that 
would affect book-tax differences in either the parent’s home country or the affiliate’s 
country would be absorbed by the country-pair-year fixed effects. 
 
 In addition, our sample includes a set of parent home countries that employ 
worldwide taxation systems under which subsidiary income is subject to taxation in the 
parent country. For multinational entities headquartered in such countries, profit shifting 
incentives are accordingly diminished (see our discussion in Section 2). This would also 
create a bias against our finding, as parents in countries with worldwide taxation would be 
less likely to shift income to low-tax affiliates. Moreover, changes in parent country tax rates 
and rules would be absorbed by the country-pair-year fixed effects. 
As discussed previously, the baseline regressions all exclude observations for which 
the affiliate’s income is negative and those for which the parent’s constructed profit shock is 
                                                          
33 Note that the lowest tax rate in our sample is 10%, whereas many non-European havens have a zero tax rate. 
Thus, the incentives to shift income to such havens would presumably be stronger than the incentives to shift 
income to low-tax European countries in our sample. 
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negative. This reflects the likelihood that income shifting incentives would be attenuated in 
the presence of losses, because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. It is 
possible, however, that there may be some loss of information associated with excluding 
these observations. Thus, as foreshadowed in Section 3, we conduct a robustness check that 
involves retaining these observations in the estimating sample, with the log specification in 
Equation (8) modified as described in Section 3. The results are quite similar to the baseline 
results in Tables 3-5. However, they are somewhat weaker in terms of significance, with the 
coefficient on the interaction term of interest being only of borderline statistical significance. 
This finding is consistent with the idea that limitations on loss offsets lead to attenuated 
income shifting incentives in the presence of losses.  
Finally, it is unlikely that the estimated effect can be explained by the types of 
tunnelling activities analyzed in Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002). The affiliates in 
our sample are held by their parents with at least a 90% ownership stake. The results, 
moreover, are robust to restricting the sample purely to those affiliates that are 100% owned 
by the parent. As long as 100% of the cash-flow rights associated with stock in the subsidiary 
are held by the parent, the parent’s controlling shareholder (if one exists) has no incentive to 
tunnel income from the affiliate to the parent firm (or vice versa). The only scenario in which 
tunnelling might potentially confound the results is when affiliates issue dual-class stock, 
with the parent owning 100% of the voting stock but significantly less of the cash-flow rights, 
and where the parent owns a larger share of the cash-flow rights at low-tax affiliates than at 
high-tax affiliates. AMADEUS does not report information about dual-class stock, but the 
scenario sketched above seems an unlikely one. For example, Faccio and Lang (2002) trace 
the ownership patterns of a large set of European corporations, and find that divergence 
between cash-flow rights and voting rights is of importance in only a few of their sample 
countries. Moreover, such devices may be thought to be particularly unlikely among 
multinational entities. 
 
6) Conclusion 
Multinational profit shifting activities are perceived to be a major threat to the tax 
base of high-tax economies around the world. However, empirically testing for profit shifting 
behavior is inherently difficult as it requires a way to isolate tax motivations. Existing studies 
employ indirect identification approaches that analyze shifting behaviour by estimating firm 
responses (adjustments in reported pre-tax profitability, intra-firm transfer prices or debt-
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equity structure) to changes in the corporate tax rate or the difference in tax rates between 
home and host countries. Identification is thus based on rather infrequent changes in statutory 
corporate tax rates, which are difficult to differentiate from contemporaneous changes in the 
home and/or host country’s political, social or economic environment. Moreover, tax changes 
may affect other determinants of profitability such as management effort, potentially 
confounding the estimates of income-shifting. 
Our paper develops a new identification approach based on the idea that in the 
presence of profit shifting, exogenous earnings shocks to a multinational parent firm would 
be expected to propagate differently to foreign subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax countries. 
Specifically, if a multinational group engages in corporate profit shifting activities in order to 
reduce its corporate tax burden, it would be expected to transfer a fraction of the additional 
parent earnings to its low-tax subsidiaries only. This allows us to use the multinational’s 
high-tax affiliates as a control group to absorb other (technological or financial) channels 
through which parent earnings may affect subsidiary profitability. As pre-shifting earnings 
change frequently and continuously, our identification strategy uses a rich source of variation, 
and also allows us to control for country-specific and country-pair-specific time effects of 
arbitrary form.  
This identification approach is implemented using a large and comprehensive panel 
data set on European firms. We construct exogenous earnings shocks to multinational parent 
corporations by exploiting annual profitability information on a large set of comparable firms 
operating in the same four-digit industry and/or the same country as the parent. Our 
regression results indicate that these exogenous changes in parent earnings exert a 
significantly positive effect on the profitability of low-tax subsidiaries, relative to the effect 
on the profitability of high-tax subsidiaries. This result is robust to controlling for various 
sources of nontax heterogeneity across low-tax and high-tax affiliates.  
The paper’s primary contribution is thus to find support for the hypothesis of tax-
motivated income-shifting, using a very different identification strategy than those used in the 
previous literature. This approach thus deepens and enriches the sources of evidence on this 
issue. For example, it enables us to rule out the possibility that profit shifting results are 
merely an artefact of country-pair-specific time effects. Quantitatively, the estimates suggest 
that at the margin around 2% of the (additional) parent profits are transferred to low-tax 
subsidiaries. This represents a substantial effect, although it is somewhat smaller than that 
found in the previous literature using changes in corporate tax rates as the source of 
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identification. On the other hand, the fact that the estimates are not larger in magnitude also 
suggests that existing economic and legal frictions (such as transfer pricing regulations and 
thin-capitalization rules) constraining tax planning play an important role. 
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Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiary Country Parent Country
Austria 67 90
Belgium 391 512
Czech Republic 184 1
Denmark 321 461
Estonia 106 5
Finland 259 317
France 645 1263
Germany 241 930
Great Britain 800 166
Greece 51 12
Hungary 86 3
Ireland 98 8
Italy 429 279
Latvia 44 0
Lithuania 25 0
Luxembourg 23 102
Netherlands 265 235
Poland 336 5
Portugal 93 28
Slovakia 35 0
Spain 535 161
Sweden 364 820
Sum 5,398 5,398
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Subsidiary Characteristics
Pre-tax ProfitsF 21, 298 7, 584.8 53, 057.98 1 3, 926, 446
Total AssetsF 21, 298 115, 078.2 571, 304.9 6 5.48e+ 07
GDP per CapitaN 21, 298 21, 598.96 8385.69 1811.24 60, 311.23
Population 21, 298 34, 958.92 24, 534.73 411.60 82, 536.68
Corporate Tax Rate 21, 298 .3322 .0658 0.10 .57
Financial Depth† 20, 154 .6709 .2709 .1031 3.2074
Low Tax Subsidiary 21, 298 .60 0.49 0 1
Parent Characteristics
Total AssetsF 21, 298 4, 052, 612 1.11e+ 07 8 1.61e+ 08
Profitability Shocks
Profitability (p˜it Co-Ind
) 18, 408 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.33
Profitability (p˜it Ind
) 17, 802 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.31
Profitability (p˜it Co
) 21, 298 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.10
Pre-tax and Pre-shifting Profits
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Co-Ind∗) 18, 408 220, 211.1 1, 003, 638 .22 2.24e+ 07
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Ind∗) 17, 802 150, 172.3 419, 698.5 0.00 9, 389, 824
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Co∗) 21, 298 181, 472.6 533, 935 0.20 9, 462, 049
Notes:
F In thousand US dollars, current prices.
N In US dollars, current prices.
 In thousands.
† Financial depth depicts the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP as a proxy for financial
development obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt
(2009).
 Profitability p˜it represents the pre-tax and pre-shifting profitability of the parent of a considered
affiliate, which is constructed as the asset weighted average of all firms in the same 4-digit NACE
industry and the same country (“Co-Ind”), the same 4-digit NACE industry(“Ind”) and the same
country(“Co”) respectively.
∗ Profitability piit represents the pre-tax and pre-shifting profit of the parent of a considered affiliate,
which is constructed as the product of the asset weighted average profitability p˜it of all firms
in the same 4-digit NACE industry and the same country (“Co-Ind”)/ the same 4-digit NACE
industry(“Ind”)/the same country(“Co”) and the parent firm’s total asset stock.
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Table 6: Robustness Tests, Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Tax
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Parent Profit × Low-tax Subs .0342∗∗ .0447∗∗∗ .0563∗∗∗
(.0161) (.0146) (.0180)
Log Parent Profit .0405 −.0181 −.0248
(.0323) (.0137) (.0172)
Log Parent Profit×Financial Depth −.0617
(.0413)
Log Group Profit .0208∗∗ .0099
(.0104) (.0125)
Log Total Assets .6987∗∗∗ .7215∗∗∗ .6629∗∗∗ .7188∗∗∗ .6970∗∗∗
(.0323) (.0442) (.0530) (.0377) (.0507)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Country-Pair-Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Sample All FD> 0.5 FD> 0.65 All All
Observations 17, 095 14, 101 8, 758 16, 318 13, 036
Number of Firms 4, 685 3, 640 2, 236 4, 173 3, 343
R Squared Within 0.2832 0.2670 0.2538 0.3016 0.3147
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries
with a foreign parent firm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the subsidiary’s pre–tax profit.
The variable Log Parent Profit in specifications (1) to (3) depicts the logarithm of the parent firm’s
pre-shifting profit as constructed in Section 4 (using firms in the same country and the same 4-digit
NACE industry for construction). Analogously, Log Group Profit depicts the logarithm of the sum of
pre-shifting profits at all group affiliates with a higher (lower) corporate tax rate than the considered
affiliate in specification 4 (specification 5). Low-tax Subs is a dummy variable that takes on the value
1 if the subsidiary exhibits a lower statutory corporate tax rate than the parent firm. Log Total
Assets is the logarithm of the subsidiary’s total asset stock. Financial depth (abbreviated “FD”)
depicts the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP as a proxy for financial development which
is obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009).
Year Dummies (Industry-Year Dummies) indicate a full set of year fixed effects (industry-year fixed
effects at the 2-digit NACE level). Country-Year Dummies depict a full set of country-year fixed
effects for the subsidiary country. Country-Pair-Year Dummies depict country-pair-year fixed effects
for the subsidiary and the parent country.
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